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To the physician and surgeon, "malpractite' is an ill-favored word,
nearly synonymous with quack and charlatan. "His reputation, his live-
lihood, his social position, and the entire medical profession are threat-
ened when any suspicion of malpractice is aired."2 That "malpractice"
should convey overtones of moral turpitude3 is an unfortunate, but signifi-
cant factor in the present medico-legal quandary. "Malpractice," better
connoted as '"professional liability," implies only that the victu .of ac-
tionable negligence should be compensated for the injuries flowing there-
from.
Activity in the area of "professional liability" has been intensified in
recent years 4 The decline of physician-patient intimacy, the trend to-
wards specialization, a growing awareness of liabilify insurance and so-
ciety's augmented "sympathy" towards the injured claimant have con-
tributed far more to the increase than any substantive change in the law.
Fundamentally, the "malpractice" enigma is evidentiary, for the
substantive elements of the tort are relatively clear. The general pre-
requisite of expert testimony, coupled with the medical profession's
"conspiracy of silence" have created an anomalous "right," embarrassingly
lacking the correlative "remedy."5  It is an unearthing of this "remedy"
"Malpractice may be defined as the failure upon the part of a physician or dentist
properly to perform the duty which devolves upon him in his professional relation
to his patient, a failure which results in some injury to the patient" REGAN, Doc-
TOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw 17 (3rd ed. 1956).
-Shindell, Medicine Versus Law; A Proposal for Settlement, 151 A.M.A.J. 1078,
1079 (1953).
8Malpractice has been defined as "Any professional misconduct, unreasonable lack
of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or in-
moral conduct." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). (emphasis supplied).
' "Some 5000 cases are now being tried each year with thousands of other cases set-
tled out of court. Since 1950, one out of every 35 doctors insured under the New
York State Medical Society's group insurance plan has been sued in the courts for
malpracce." Newsweek, July 11, 1955. Although a recent study by the Law De-
partment of the American Medical Association is inconclusive on this point. Stetler,
The History of Reported Medical Professtonal Liability Cases, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 366,
377 (1957).
"Malpractice is hard to prove. The physician has all of the advantage of position.
He is, presumably, an expert. The patient is a layman. The physician knows what
is done and its significance. The patient may or may not know what is done. He
seldom knows its significance. He judges chiefly by results. Physicians, like
lawyers, are loath to testify that a fellow craftsman has been negligent, especially
when he is highly reputable in professional character, as are these defendants. In
short, the physician has the advantage of knowledge and of proof." Christie v.
Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1941). Also see works of Melvin M.
Belli, one of the leading exponents of the plaintiff's position. Belli, An Anctent
Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L. REV. 250 (1956);
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through judicial and extra-judicial circumvention of the "conspiriacy;'
to which this note is devoted.
SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE TORT
"Malpractice" sounds in tort, being a composite of the basic elements
of duty, breach of duty and injuries proximately resulting therefrom. The
duty which the physician owes to his patient and the standard by which
he is judged is dearly set forth in the leading Ohio decision of Gillette v.
Tucker:
A surgeon and physician, employed to treat a case professionally, is
under an obigaton, which the law implies from the employment, to exer-
cise the average degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members
of the same profession, practicing in the same or similar locality, in the
light of the present state of medical and surgical science (emphasis
supplied).
Furthermore, if a physician represents himself as having greater skill than
the general practitioner, as does a specialist, he must exercise that de-
gree of skill and knowledge which is ordinarily possessed by physicians
and surgeons who devote special attention and study to the area in which
he has held himself out as an expert.7
The "science" of medicine is no more exacting than man's frailties
will permit. It is more a highly specialized art, often involving a choice
between discretionary paths. Society will neither hold the physician a
warrantor, nor an insurer merely for following the wrong path.8 But
neither will the physician be permitted to hide behind the cloak of pro-
fessional customs which are obviously dangerous. While conformity to
custom will be weighed, it is not the controlling test.9
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The proverbial excuse that "the operation was a success, but the
patient died" expresses the necessity of establishing the causal relationship
Belli, Ready for the Plaintiff, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 408 (1957); BELLI, MODERN TRIALS
(1954)
'67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902); see also 70 CJ.S., Physicians and Surgeons
§ 41 (1951).
7 Beach v. Chollett, 31 Ohio App. 8, 166 N.E. 145 (1928); 70 C.J.S., Physicians and
Surgeons § 41 (1951)
'So held one of Ohio's earliest recorded malpractice decisions. In Grindle v. Rush
and Greene, 7 Ohio 123, 125 (1836) the court stated: 'The event is in the hands
of Him who giveth life, and not within the physical control of the most skillful of
the profession." Also see Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919);
70 CJ.S., Physicians and Surgeons § 47 (1951).
9 Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928), where surgeon, failing to
remove sponge from patient's abdomen, attempted to shift responsibility by showing
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between act and injuries resulting therefrom. Unlike the more com-
mon tort actions, such as auto collision, the plaintiff in the malpractice
situation is usually suffering from physical maladies before the alleged
negligence occurred. Whether the failure to cure is a result of the
physician's negligence or inevitable by virtue of nature's divine authority,
is often a matter of conjecture. A court's refusal to send questions of
such a speculative nature to a jury, may make the establishment of
"proximate cause" an insurmountable challenge.'0
DEFENSES
In malpractice, as in other actions founded on negligence, the usual
defenses of contributory negligence 1 and assumption of risk 2 are availa-
ble. In Ohio, a far more effective bar is a short one year statute of
limitations.' 3 Consequently, negligence is ofttimes discovered after the
statute has run. The harshness has been mitigated through the interpre-
tation that the statute does not begin to run until the termination of the
physician-patient relationship.' 4 The presence, in Ohio, of such legisla-
it was customary for surgeons to rely on accuracy of nurses count. This case is oft
cited for the general proposition that methods employed in any trade or business,
however long contnued, cannot avail to establish as safe in law that which is dan-
gerous in fact Conformity to custom or usage, however, is a matter proper to be
submitted to the jury and weighed in determining whether or not ordinary care has
been exercised. Ribarmn v. Kessler, 78 Ohio App. 289, 70 N.E.2d 107 (1946).1
'In Kuhn v. Baker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938), plaintiff, a 55
year old woman, was treated by defendant surgeon for a broken femur (thigh) bone.
Upon removal of the splint, defendant forced the plaintiff to walk, although no
X-Ray was taken. A union of the bones had not taken place and there was suf-
ficient evidence to establish defendant's negligence and that the defendant had
destroyed all possibility of the bones healing properly. Expert testimony was offered
to the effect that had proper steps been followed there was only one chance in four
that the bones would unite on resetting. Verdict was directed for the defendant be-
cause of lack of proof that the failure of bones to unite was probably caused by the
negligent acts of the defendant. See PROssER, TORTS § 44 (2 ed. 1955).
' Geiselnan v. Scott, 25 Ohio St. 86 (1874) For a harsh application see Champs
v. Stone, 74 Ohio App. 344, 58 N.E.2d 803 (1944) where patient was held guilty
of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, for submitting to treatment by an in-
toxicated physician. Also see 70 C.J.S., Physc-ans and Surgeons § 51 (1951).
' Where plaintiff afflicted with epilepsy submitted to chiropractic treatment, know-
ing ill effects would result from discontinued use of medication; court applied "vol-
enti non fit injuria." Kirschner v. Keller, 70 Ohio App. 111, 42 N.E.2d 463 (1942).
Where prior to operation the doctor fully explains the risks involved, assumption of
risk is a good defense. Mainfort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Op. 440, 111 N.E.2d
692 (C.P. 1951).
2Oi-o REy. CODE 9 2305.11.
"'Amstutz v. King, 103 Ohio St 674, 135 N.E. 973 (1921); Bowers v. Santee, 99
Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E.
825 (1902). For a thorough treatment of the Statute of Limitations in Ohio mal-
practice actions see Note, 9 WEST. RES. L. REv. 92 (1957)
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tion is indicative of a strong public policy aimed at the protection of its
esteemed medical men, although it may have been partially influenced
by an attorney-oriented legislature, attempting to protect its own skin
under this guise.
PROOF - THE RIGHT WITHOUT THE REMEDY;
EXPERT TEsTIMONY REQUIREMENT
The mysteries of the "healing art" are beyond comprehension to the
lay judge and jury. Consequently, the layman is incompetent to de-
termine the standard of skill possessed by the ordinary physician or
medical specialist. Neither is it within his ability to determine, with
any degree of precision, causal relationships between the wrongful diag-
nosis or improper treatment and the ultimate injury. Thus, in the gen-
eral malpractice case, the judge and jury must be dependent upon the
testimony of experts.' 5 Herein lies the crux of the malpractice dilemma,
for this dependence upon a witness, generally non-existent or adverse
to the plaintiff, usually results in non-suit and often discourages even
the most courageous attorneys from accepting clients with meritorious
malpractice claims.16
The medical profession, however, is not entirely deserving of the
censure received for "dosing ranks" at the scent of a malpractice claim.' 7
A multitude of factors, social and economic, create the "conspiracy of
silence." There is an honest belief among physicians, that they are, or
may themselves become, the victims of designing patients with feigned
claims. Such nuisance suits even though defeated, stigmatize the physi-
cian, as well as his entire profession. Then there is the professional
"esprit de corps." The physician, through professional and social asso-
ciation, has developed a comradeship which makes it almost impossible
to persuade him to testify against another physician - especially where
both are from the same community. The heavy incidence of insurance
premiums, along with the fear that testifying will result in cancellation
of his own professional liability policy'" are compelling economic in-
'Hubach v. Cole, 133 Ohio St. 137, 31 N.E.2d 736 (1938); Modrzynski v. Lust, 55
Ohio L Abs. 106,88 N.E.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1949); see Annot. 141 A.L.R. 5 (1942);
70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 62 (1951)
" "Anyone familiar with cases of this character knows that the so-called ethical prac-
titioner will not testify on behalf of a plaintiff regardless of the merits of his case."
Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 234 P.2d 34, 46 (1951). See Belli, An
Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 ViLL. L. REV.
250 (1957)
' For a caustic reply to Belli, see Stetler, Medical-Legal Relations - The Brighter
Side, 2 ViLI. L REv. 487 (1957).
' It has been alleged, although it is difficult to prove, that the real conspirators are
the insurance companies who wield the whip that keeps the medical men silent
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fluences. Then too, there is the medical man's natural aversion to liti-
gation, resulting from the fear of a brutal cross-examination, and loss of
valuable tune in the court room.' 9 The pressures of local medical so-
cieties, fear of ostracism, and ambiguities of the medical canons20 are
the clinchers. The physician's reluctance to take the witness stand is
therefore understandable, and any real solution to the problem will have
to take these factors into consideration.
Although a reputable physician will rarely testify against another
practitioner in his own community, it is possible in Ohio, and other
liberal jurisdictions, to admit the testimony of experts from a similar
locality21 It is not a prerequisite that the expert witness belong to the
same school of medicine as the defendant - only that he be familiar
with the defendant's school, and that the criterion by which the witness
measures the defendant's treatment is that of defendant's own school of
practice.
22
The unavailability of expert testimony occasionally forces resourceful
counsel to take unorthodox steps in order to avoid non-suit. In Cali-
fornia, the plaintiff may call the defendant physician and elicit from
him expert testimony, without making him his own witness.2 3 The
California statute is liberally construed so as to enable such testimony to
establish the plaintiffs case, as well as supply the deficient expert testi-
mony. In Ohio, although the defendant may be called as an adverse
party under statute,2 4 the plaintiff cannot thereby make out his case in
chief. 25 Another technique employed in a "last ditch stand" is subpoena.
ing a physician at random, hoping to catch a naive practitioner and ob-
Belli, An Anctent Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL. L.
Rv. 250,253 (1956).
"
9Hall, Let's Understand Each Other, 42 ILL. B.J. 690 (1954).
' Though categorically denied by the medical profession. Hall, Let's Understand
Each Other, 42 ILL. B.J. 690 (1954).
' Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902); Mutschman v. Petry, 46
Ohio App. 525, 189 N.E. 658 (1933); Ardoline v. Deegan, 149 Conn. 552, 102
A.2d 352 (1954); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 689 (1953); Gist
v. French, 136 Cal. App.2d 247, 288 P.2d 1003 (1955). Traditionally an expert
could not testify in a malpractice case unless he was from the same community as
the defendant. 70 CJ.S., Physicians and Surgeons § 43 (1951).
'In Willet v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (1938) physicians in
general practice were permitted to give their opinions relative to care exercised by
the defendant chiropractor. See also Porter v. Puryear, 262 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953), reversed on other grounds, 153 Tex. 82, 264 S.W.2d 689 (1954);
Annot. 78 A.L. 694 (1931); 41 AM. JtR., Physicians and Surgeons § 130
(1942).
23Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944)
' Oio RIv. CoDn § 2317.07.
zForthofer v. Arnold, 60 Ohio App. 436, 21 N.E.2d 869 (1938).
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tam his expert testimony before he is silenced by external forces. 28 Such
desperate efforts point up the difficulty of the expert witness problem,
but are hardly recommended as its solution.
PROOF OF MALPRACTICE WITHOUT THE EXPERT WITNESS:
TREATISES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
At common law, published texts, treatises and pamphlets were mad-
missible as independent evidence under the "hearsay rule."27  In Alabama,
an exception is made to the "hearsay rule" in this area. The Alabama
argument, set forth in 1857, still remains forceful
It is the boast of this age of advancing art, the collected learning of the
past ages has been transmitted to us. Shall we withhold the benefits of
this heritage, from the contests of the courtroom )2
When balancing the unavailability of expert testimony against the desire
to make use of eminent authority, and considering the trustworthy state
of mind of the authority, writing with neither motive to misrepresent, nor
view towards litigation, the "hearsay" objection seems indeed flimsy.29
Opponents to the introduction of such published material into evi-
dence contend that it will confuse the jury and that it may be obsolete
by the time of the trial. Whenever technical evidence is offered, how-
ever, there is the risk of confusing the jury. Nor is there a guarantee
that the live witness is himself up to date on current developments. Un-
der our adversary system it is the task of counsel to resolve such questions
while the trial progresses.
Several states have enacted statutes, permitting introduction of pub-
lished treatises, periodicals and books, at the court's discretion, where the
author is recognized as an expert in his profession.30 Ohio thus far is
" Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL
L REv. 250, 259 (1956).
n32 C.J.S., Evidence § 718 (1942); Note 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 252 (1954-55).
'Stoudenmeler v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558, 567 (1897); see also City of Dothan
v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 188 So. 264 (1939); Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co. 222
Ala. 394, 133 So. 16 (1931).
2 6 WiGMOR, EvlDENcE 5 1690-92 (3rd ed. 1940).
tiNEv. REv. STAT. § 51:040 (1953); and MAss. GEN. LAws (Ter. Ed.) c, 233, 5
79c (1949) as follows:
"A statement of fact or opinion on a subject of science or art contained
in a published treatise, periodical, book or pamphlet shall, in the discretion
of the court, and if the court finds that it is relevant and that the writer
of such statement is recognized in his profession or calling as an expert on
the subject, be admissible in actions of malpractice provided (the
party offering the evidence) shall give the adverse party notice
of such intention. "
Also see the Model Code of Evidence, rule 529 (1942)
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content to follow the common law.al If, however, the reluctance of the
physician to testify is not abated, Ohio would do well to adopt a more
liberal attitude in this area.
HOSPITAL RECORDS AS EVIDENCE
Evidence from hospital records will not substitute for expert testi-
mony, but is useful as proof of the details of diagnosis and treatment,
thereby showing that the plaintiff's injury may be attributable to the
defendant's acts or omissions. At common law, hospital records were
excluded under the "hearsay rule. '32 The trend, however, is towards ad-
mitting such evidence either as a "hearsay" exception,3 3 or under a
statute.3 4 Such evidence though dearly "hearsay," is admitted upon the
premise that records kept in the course of business, with no motive to
falsify, will be accurate.
Ohio is among the states adopting, in substance, the Uniform Business
Records Act, 35 under which records of observable facts, transactions, oc-
currences or events incident to the treatment of the patient and helpful
to an understanding of the medical or surgical aspects of his hospitaliza-
non are admissible.38 It is necessary, however, to use such evidence with
caution as there is always the possibility of alterations. Whenever pos-
sible, original documents should be secured, in preference to photostatic
coples. 3
7
ESTABLISHING MALPRACTICE WITHOUT EXPERT EVIDENCE:
CoMMoN KNOWLEDGE AND NON-TECHNICAL ISSUES
Although in the great majority of professional liability cases, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to produce expert testimony, there are a
'Hallworth v. Republic Steel Corp., 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E.2d 690 (1950).
' Jordon v. Apter, 93 Conn. 302, 105 Ad. 620 (1919); Griebel v. Brooklyn Heights
Ry. Co., 95 App. Div. 214, 88 N.Y. Supp. 767 (1906); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 386
(1931); REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 271 (Ord ed. 1956).
'Globe Indemnity Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 Ad. 43 (1927); Adler v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1929); Barfield v. South Highlands In-
firmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915); Annot., 75 A.L.R. 378 (1931); REGAN,
DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 271 (3rd ed. 1956).
For states adopting the Uniform Business Records Act, see HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STAT LAws 331
(1956); also see 5 WGMORE, EvIDENCE § 1520, (3rd ed. 1940).
E OHio REv. CODE § 2317.40.
'Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947); Mutschman v. Petty,
46 Ohio App. 525, 189 N.E. 658 (1933); McCormick, The Use of Hospttal Rec-
ords as Evidence, 26 TUL. L REv. 371 (1952).
'Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 VILL.
L RE. 250, 275 (1956).
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number of exceptions and limitations to this rule.3 8 Such an exception
is generally found to exist in cases wherein the physician's or surgeon's
want of skill or lack of care is so gross as to be within the comprehension
of laymen and to require only common knowledge and experience to
understand it.
Ohio has held that in a malpractice action, it is not requisite that the
plaintiff offer expert testimony in order to have the case submitted to the
jury, where a violation of the defendant's duty is otherwise made to
appear.3 9
Thus, where a surgeon removed a child's tonsils and adenoids, and
failed to visit the child in response to an urgent telephone call from the
father, the court said:
The rule is recognized in Ohio, and we believe properly so, that ex-
pert testimony is not always required to enable a jury to determine whether
a physician has been guilty of negligence or malpractice, and this is par-
ticularly so where the conduct of a treatment administered by the physi-
cian is of such of character as to warrant the inference of want of care
or negligence in the light of knowledge and experience of the jurors them-
selves as ordinary laymen.'
BATTERY CASES
It is a well established rule that "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages."41 Only
- REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AM TH LAW § 29 (3rd ed. 1956); Annot. 141
A.L.R. 5 (1942) Often quoted is the following illustrative passage from Evans v.
Roberts, 172 Iowa 653, 658, 154 N.W 923, 925 (1915) and Vergeldt v. Hartzell,
1 F.2d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1924) "If a surgeon, undertaking to remove a tumor
from a person's scalp, lets his knife slip and cuts off his patient's ear, or, if he un-
dertakes to stitch a wound on the patient's cheek, and, by an awkward move thrusts
his needle into the patient's eye, or, if a dentist, in his haste, leaves a decayed tooth
in the jaw of his patient and removes one which is perfectly sound and serviceable,
the charitable presumptions, which ordinarily protect the practitioner against legal
blame where his treatment is unsuccessful, are not here available. It is a matter of
common knowledge and observation that such things do not ordinarily attend the
service of one possessing ordinary skill and experience in the delicate work of sur-
gery. It does not need scientific knowledge or training to understand that, ordinar-
ily speaking, such results are unnecessary and are not anticipated, if reasonable care
be exercised by the operator."
'Bradshaw v. Wilson, 87 Ohio App. 319, 94 N.E.2d 706 (1950); Smith v. Mc-
Dougall, 65 Ohio App. 152, 29 N.E.2d 441 (1940); Slosser v. Lagorin, 44 Ohio
App. 253, 188 N.E. 210 (1933); Francis v. Brooks, 24 Ohio App. 136, 156 N.E.
609 (1926).
' Wharton v. Long, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 147, 150 (Ct. App. 1934) (Although holding
expert testimony necessary to establish causal relationship between defendant's fail-
ure to attend and the resulting injury)




in cases of emergency may the physician violate this rule with impunity.2
Typically, the issue in the "battery" case revolves around the non-technical
question of the pauent's consent and therefore expert testimony is not
required. 48
JuDiciAL NonicE
Occasionally "common knowledge" has been expanded into a form of
"judicial notice."44 Some courts, for instance, will, in the absence of ex-
pert testimony, take "judicial notice" of the fact that a failure to make
use of the X-Ray to diagnose a fracture amounts to a failure to exercise
that degree of care and diligence ordinarily exercised by physicians of
good standing.45 Likewise, courts have taken "judicial notice" that an
infection was caused by the doctor's negligence where an unsterile instru-
ment was used."
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
No development in the arena of medico-legal relations has occasioned
more approbation and cheer to the plaintiff's counsel and more despair
to the medical profession than the incorporation of three old Latin terms
into the field of malpractice litigation. Indeed, "res ipsa loquitur"47
(i.e. the thing speaks for itself) has come a long way from the case in
which a barrel rolled out of a warehouse window on to a passing pedes-
'Annot, 76 A.LR. 551 (1932); Annot., 139 A.LR. 1374 (1942); REGAN, Doc-
TOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW, § 11 (3rd ed. 1956).
'Performance of an operation upon a minor child, without obtaining parental con-
sent, raises an interesting "battery" problem. See 9 WEST. RE s. L. REV. 101
(1957).
"For general discussion see 9 WIGMORl, EVIDENcE § 2580 (3rd ed. 1940), 1957
Supp. p. 2 6 3 et seq.
'Agnew v. Los Angelos, 97 Cal. App.2d 557, 218 P.2d 66 (1950) See also Lippold
v. Kidd, 126 Ore. 160, 269 Pac. 210 (1928).
" Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 291 Pac. 173 (1930); Mastro v. Kennedy, 57
Cal. App.2d 499, 134 P.2d 865 (1943).
'
TPROssER, TORTs § 42 (2d ed. 1955) describes "res ipsa loquitur" as one type of
circumstantial evidence which arises where:
"a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence, and
b. The apparent cause of the accident is such that the defendant would be re-
sponsible for any negligence connected with it, and
c. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff re-
sponsible is eliminated." "Some authority suggests the additional requirement that
the evidence as to the explanation of the accident must be more readily accessible to
the defendant than to the plaintiff." See also 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 19.5 et seq (1956); 3 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 327 (1954)
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trian,48 to the case of the patient who awoke from an appendectomy
operation with a mysteriously injured shoulder. 9
Though contextually, the comparison between the pedestrian and the
unconscious patient may seem remote, both plaintiffs are really in a
strikingly analogous predicament. In both situations, the plaintiffs are
unaware of the pending danger. The pedestrian knows little more of the
negligent activities of the warehouse employees than the unconscious pa-
tient knows of the operative steps taken by his surgeon. In either case,
the knowledge of any negligent acts is exclusively within the sealed lips
of the defendant. In either case, the injury is of a nature which human
experience has discovered generally does not occur in the absence of
negligence. And so the court, in effect, will now say- Mr. Defendant,
the plaintiff has shown facts sufficient to warrant an inference (pre-
sumption in some jurisdictions) 50 of negligence, which the jury may con-
sider, along with the evidence which you offer to rebutt that inference.
The plaintiff escapes non-suit for lack of expert testimony and most like-
ly has won a verdict.
The expansion of "res ipsa" into the malpractice area has not been
without obstacles. In Ewtng v. Goode5l Justice Taft, then serving on a
federal circuit court in Ohio, made the following persuasive and oft
quoted statement:
A physician is not a warrantor of cures. If the maxim, "res ipsa
loquitur" were applicable to a case like this, and a failure to cure were
held to be evidence, however, slight, of negligence on the part of the phy-
sician or surgeon causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough
to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial liabil
ity for nearly all of the "ills that flesh is heir to."'
However, where a surgeon neglects to remove sponges or forceps from
his patient's abdomen even Justice Taft would probably relent, for one
does not need an expert, in such instance, to inform him that the surgeon
was guilty of a gross lack of skill and care.5 3
"Res ipsa loquitur" has also been applied where a patient under sur-
gery awakes from the operation to discover an injury to a healthy part of
his body, or to a part of his body "remote" from the "area of operation, ' 54
"aByrne v. Boadle, 2 H&C 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863), where the "doctrine"
was for the first time uttered.
" Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
"PRossER, TORTs § 43 (2d ed. 1955)
78 Fed. 442 (C.CGS.D. Ohio 1897)
'Ewing v. Goode, supra at 443.
" Tiller v. Von Pohle, 72 Ariz. 11, 230 P.2d 213 (1951); Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82,
64 P.2d 409 (1936); REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATiENT AND THE LAW § 30 (3rd ed.
1956); Annor., 162 A.L.R. 1265 (1946)
" Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), where an appendectomy
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in cases of X-Ray burnsa5 in cases where injuries were received from
mechamcal devices and in a variety of other situations.56
Unquestionably California has wielded a heavy sword in the "res
ipsa loquitur" thrust into medical immunity. Traditionally, the "doc-
trine" was applicable only where the injury was caused by an instrumen-
tality or agency, within the excluswe control of the defendant.57 In
Ybarra v. Spangard,58 excluswe control was strikingly expanded to mean
collective control or right to control as "res ipsa loquitur" was applied
against all the doctors and hospital employees connected with the opera-
tion. 9 It has also been questionable whether "res ipsa" can prevail where
the plaintiff introduces specific evidence of the defendant's negligence or
where the plaintiff obtains expert testimony. The California courts have
held that specific charges of negligence can be made and yet "res ipsa
loquitur" may be relied upon.60 Ohio has held contra.6' Also, in Cali-
fornia the plaintiff may call an expert witness and still rely upon "res
ipsa loquitur."6 2
A rose by any other name is still a rose and the same is true of "res
was performed on patient under anesthetic and there was an injury to shoulder after
the patient recovered consciousness. In. Emrie v. Tice 174 Kan. 739, 258 P.2d 332
(1953), where X-ray injury to part of body not intentionally exposed, "res ipsa
loquitur" was held applicable. See also Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1307 (1946).
'Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S.W:2d 808 (1928); see REGAN, DOCTOR
AmD PATIENT AND TiE LAw 223 3d ed. 1956); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1326 (1946).
" "Res ipsa loquitur" held applicable against a dentist for injuries received when an
X-Ray machine fell on patient's face while she was reclining in dental chair. Bence
v. Benbo, 98 Ind. App. 52, 183 N.E. 326 (1932). Where dentist's drill slipped,
penetrating floor of mouth "res ipsa loquitur" held applicable. Vergeldt v. Hartzell,
1 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1924); see Annor., 162 A.L.R. 1265 (1946).
IPROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2d ed. 1955).
' 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); see PRossm, REs IPsA LoQurruR IN CALI-
FORNIA, in Selected Topics on the Law of Torts (1953), where Mr. Prosser hints
that application of "res ipsa loquitur" in Ybarra v. Spangard is indication of
public policy to increase burden upon the surgeon. See also the recent case of Se-
naris v. Haas, 281 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1955).
' For strict Ohio application of "exclusive control" in malpractice cases see Black-
man v. Zeligs, 90 Ohio App. 304, 103 N.E.2d 13 (1951)
"°Doke v. Pacific Crane & Rigging Co., 80 Cal. App.2d 601, 182 P.2d 284 (1947).
'In Sieling v. Mahrer, 113 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953), a malpractice action,
the court held that "res ipsa" is inapplicable when specific acts of negligence are
pleaded. The holding is not reconcilable with other Ohio "res ipsa" decisions. See
also, Keltenbach v. Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati Highway Inc., 82 Ohio App.
10, 80 N.E.2d 640 (1948); and Note, 6 WEST. RES. L. REy. 164 (1955).
' Costa v. Regents of University of California, 116 Cal. App.2d 445, 254 P.2d 85(1953). Acton was against hospital and certain doctors for alleged improper diag-
nosis and treatment of cancer which resulted in necrosis and osteomylius. The court
held that the refusal to allow plaintiff to produce expert medical evidence in support
of "res ipsa loquitur" necessitated reversal.
19581
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ipsa loquitur." Thus in Ohio where a surgeon permitted sponges to re-
main in his patient's abdomen, subsequent to a gall bladder operation, the
court held that the failure to remove such sponges was prima facie evi-
dence of negligence.6s In the more recent case of Bradshaw v. Wilson,"4
the plaintiff's fractured arm was treated by the defendant surgeon. In
performing an open operation the defendant knowingly permitted a piece
of dead bone from the fracture to remain in the flesh and cause drainage
of the wound for months. When the plaintiff subsequently received
treatment from another surgeon the wound shortly healed. Such facts
were held sufficient to create an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant. Expert testimony was held not necessary.
Critics of the "res ipsa loquitur" extension label it a "sympathy" doc-
trine, annihilating any semblance of liability predicated on fault.65 The
patient was unconscious. Only the surgeon knows what happened. The
surgeon had better be able to explain, else he must pay.66 Obviously the
law has not become so harsh. The recent California decision of Salgo v.
Leland Standford Jr.67 has, to the elation of the medical profession, ap-
plied brakes limiting the scope of the "doctrine."
The real problem is that those who censure the "doctrine" fail to rec-
ognize that we exist in a socio-economic environment and that judicial
decisions are ultimately derived from the dictates of that environment.
Such decisions therefore, must be considered in the light of society's pres-
ent trend towards individual security and welfare. The physician's "con-
spiracy of silence" defeats the plaintiff's "right" to recovery. But the
'Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928)
"Bradshaw v. Wilson, 87 Ohio App. 319, 94 N.E.2d 706 (1950). Many other
states silently give effect to the theory behind "res ipsa" though not in express terms.
See Annot., 162 A.L.R. 1265 (1946).
'Morris, Res Ipsa Loqutur-DLability Without Fault, 163 A.M.A.J. 1055 (1957);
Stetler, Medical-Legal Relations-The Brighter Side, 2 VILL. L Rnv. 487 (1957).
' For an interesting comment on the extension of "res ipsa" into the areas of calcu-
lated risk (matters beyond the scope of medical control) see 30 So. CALIF. L. R v.
80 (1956).
' 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. App. 1957). The plaintiff, whose lower extremities had
been permanently paralyzed as result of an aortography was awarded $250,000.
Reversed due to an improper charge on question of "res ipsa loquitur." In the de-
cision the court makes the following points: 1. "Res ipsa loquitur" is applicable in
malpractice actions only where it is a matter of common knowledge among layman
or medical men or both that the injury would not have occurred without negligence,
and the "doctrine" is not applicable in every case in which injury occurred while
patient was under anesthesia. 2. In absence of agreement that attending physician
would perform the aortography, which was procedure customarily performed by
hospital personnel, attending physician could not be held liable to his patient for
negligence of the hospital team. 3. Manufacturer's brochure, containing recom-
mendations as to usage of drug, is admissible, but cannot establish as a matter of law
the standard of care required of physician in use of the drug.
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law is not inflexible; the judge induced by public policy, invokes "res
ipsa loquitur" and the plaintiff is compensated. Though the expansion
of "res ipsa loquitur" into the malpractice area is yet far from receiving
untversal acceptance, the "handwriting is dearly on the wall" The ground
has but been broken in California - the frontier is certain to expand.
ExTRA-JuDicrAL SOLUTIONS
Clearly, judge-made rules and legislation can be but temporary ex-
pedients in the "malpractice dilemma." If the function of the trial is to
search out the "truth" there can be no substitute for fair and impartial
expert testimony. Avoidance of the present impasse will necessitate a
much greater degree of understanding between the legal and medical
professions.
The American Medical Association has done much towards educating
its members as to the nature of the malpractice problem. Medical peri-
odicals bombard physicians with all sorts of excellent matter on subjects
ranging from "res ipsa loquitur" to "professional liability insurance."68
Legal medicine courses have been incorporated into the curriculum of
many of our medical schools.6 9 The medical student, by learning the
basic functions of trial law can better comprehend the concept of exami-
nation and cross-examination. Such education is helpful, for it no doubt
generally appears to the average medical witness that one attorney is try-
ing to establish the truth, while the opposing counsel is trying equally
hard to suppress it. For the practitioner, The American Medical Associa-
tion sponsored in October, 1955 a series of medico-legal symposia in
Chicago, Omaha, and New York City, wherein a part of each program
at each meeting was designed to acquaint physicians with their inde-
spensability in litigation and to dispel their fears of testifying in court.70
Much of the creative thought in this area revolves around various
types of cooperative programs between bar and medical society, through
which impartial testimony could -be obtained in meritorious cases. One
recent proposal involves the creation of a board, having rotating mem-
bers of both practicing physicians and attorneys who would screen and
determine the merit of cases prior to the filing of the action. If the case
were found to be justified, a stipulation of fact would be prepared. The
bar would censure an attorney filing an action after the impartial board
rendered against it. Likewise, the medical society would censure a phy-
' See series beginning in the February 2, 1957 issue of the A.M.AJ., Also, numer-
ous features in MMICAL ECONOMiCS - Riss Ed. published for benefit of medical
students and interns.
"Hall, The Physician and the Law, 158 A.M.A.J. 257 (1955)
S159 A.M.AJ. 1638 (1955).
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sician for not fully testifying.71 Such a plan, however, may be critiazed
as imposing a prior restraint which could conceivably bar legitimate ac-
tions from the courtroom.
"Grievance" committees have been established by medical societies
in all states for the purpose of hearing complaints made against members
of the profession.7" While serving a useful purpose m screening out ob-
viously false claims, such committees are subject to criticism for the ac-
celerated difficulty in obtaining expert testimony when such committee
rules no negligence.
At best, extra-judicial solutions are for the future. Impartial boards
and committees have yet to be worked out and proved. Education and
understanding are a slow and painful process. Unfortunately, the fear-
less medical witness is not yet in sight.
CONCLUSION
The "malpractice dilemma" has been called a study in "frustration. '7 3
It is indeed a frustration from which neither attorney, physicAan nor
plaintiff is immune, and the depressing situation is by no means amelio-
rated -by the incessant prattle of charges and countercharges between
two esteemed professions. Unfortunately, a martian attitude can but
cloud the real issues from sight; for after tempers cool, all can see that
neither physician nor attorney is to blame. At the root of the problem
one finds the judicial process itself; a system which teases the victim of
what it calls actionable negligence; tells that victim he should be compen-
sated for his injuries; but imposes such formidable barriers in proving
that negligence, that recovery is had only in cases of the grossest character.
The victim is left with a "right" without a "remedy," or realistically, "no
right" at all. Such an anomaly doubtlessly arose in a pro-physician so-
ciety and the reverance in which the physicAan was held manifested itself
in the long list of decisions strictly adhering to the expert testimony re-
quirement.
There is, however, a brighter side to the plaintiff's picture, as weight
is building up on his side of the scale. It is not so much that our society
holds the medical man in less esteem than did our forefathers, but that
today the individual's welfare is given far greater stature. Thus, counter-
balances are finding their way into the reports - expanded concepts of
res ipsa loquitur" and "common knowledge," admissions of hospital rec-
7 Shmndell, Medict.' Versus Law: A Proposal for Settlement, 151 A.M.A.J. 1078
(1953).7 2 Hall, Let's Understand Each Other, 42 ILL. B.J. 690 (1954)
'Polsky, The Malpractce Dilemma: A Cure For Frustration, 30 TEMp. L.Q. 359
(1957).
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